Labor Law - Right to Work Act - Restraint of Peaceful Picketing by Jones, Jerry G.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 16 | Number 1
December 1955
Labor Law - Right to Work Act - Restraint of
Peaceful Picketing
Jerry G. Jones
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Jerry G. Jones, Labor Law - Right to Work Act - Restraint of Peaceful Picketing, 16 La. L. Rev. (1955)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol16/iss1/25
NOTES
Much of the confusion in the present law relating to prescrip-
tion of criminal prosecutions results from the cumbersome
structure of these two articles. Article 8 contains provisions
relating to three different prescriptive periods,15 and article 9
either supplements article 8 or adds a fourth prescriptive period.
Although the decision in the subject case was an attempt to bring
order to this confusion, it does not appear to have improved upon
the original situation. It is submitted that the most logical rem-
edy to the situation is corrective legislation. In order to avoid
the present confusion in structure and language, the prescriptive
period for charging the crime and the period for bringing the
defendant to trial after the charge is filed should be stated in
separate articles, each including its own provisions as to inter-
ruption and suspension. The provision for the three-year period
should include the following:
(1) The period should begin to run from the date of the
charge.
(2) After the lapse of three years, an accused should have
an absolute right to a nolle prosequi if he can show that nothing
has occurred that would cause the period to be interrupted or
suspended.
(3) Interruption of the period should be limited to acts of
the accused as now provided in articles 8 and 9.
(4) A provision for suspension -of the period by occurrences
not within the control of the state or the accused should also be
included in order to codify the rules developed by the courts on
the subject.10
William J. Doran, Jr.
LABOR LAW - RIGHT TO WORK ACT - RESTRAINT OF
PEACEFUL PICKETING
Plaintiff was engaged in the business of operating a super-
market. Two of its employees, both of whom were meatcutters
15. Article 8 provides for a one-year prescription upon the filing of the indict-
ment running from the time the offense has been made known to the authorities.
It also provides for a prescription of six months from the date of the offense on
prosecutions for any fine or forfeiture.
16. E.g., concerning the insanity of the accused, see State v. Theard, 212 La.
1022, 34 So.2d 248 (1948). For a general discussion see Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 462
(1953).
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and members of defendant labor union, presented to plaintiff a
proposed labor contract, one provision of which stated:
"The employer [plaintiff] shall recognize the union [defend-
ant] as the sole bargaining agent for all the employer's
employees in the meat department, poultry and fish which
have to do with wages, hours of labor, and working condi-
tions, excluding all supervisors as defined in the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947, as amended."
Upon plaintiff's refusal to bargain with defendant, the two
meatcutters went on strike and engaged in peaceful picketing
of plaintiff's place of business. Plaintiff thereafter employed a
non-union meatcutter and sought an injunction against the
picketing, alleging a violation of the Louisiana Right to Work
Act. The district court denied the injunction. On appeal to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, held, reversed. The purpose of the
picketing was to compel plaintiff to enter into a contract which
would have the effect of abridging the rights of the non-union
meatcutter because of membership in a labor organization. The
non-union employee's rights would be "diminished, reduced, cur-
tailed, or shortened" by having a union act as his agent. Piegts
v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local No. 437, AFL, 228 La. 131,
81 So.2d 835 (1955).1
Section 14(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
19472 provides, in effect, that nothing in the act is to be con-
strued as authorizing any union shop, maintenance of member-
ship, or other form of compulsory unionism agreement' in any
state where such agreement is forbidden by state statute. This
federal sanction has encouraged the passage of the so-called
"Right to Work Acts" in a number of states. 4 The purpose of
1. Rehearing not considered.
2. 49 STAT. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1947).
3. The closed shop, union shop, and maintenance of membership agreements
are categorized as "union security" devices, that is, these agreements fix the
position of the union in the plant and its relation to the workers in their jobs. A
closed shop agreement obligates the employer to hire only union members. Union
shop agreements require membership in a union as a condition of continued em-
ployment, usually requiring the employee to become a union member within 30
days after initial employment. A maintenance of membership clause means
that all employees who are union members at a specified time after execution
of the contract or later join the union must remain members for the duration of
the contract as a condition of employment.
4. Ala. Acts 1953, No. 430, p. 535; ARiz. CONST. art II, § 35; ARK. STATS.§§ 81-201-205 (1947) ; FLA. CONST. (Declaration of Rights) § 12; Ga. Acts
1947, No. 140, p. 616; IOWA CODE § 736A.2 (1946) ; Miss Acts 1954, No. 1394,
p. 273; NEB. CONST. art. XV, §§ 13, 14, 15; NEn. REV. STAT. § 48-217 (1943);
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such statutes is to insure that employment will not be denied
because of membership or non-membership in a labor organiza-
tion. Thus, the Louisiana Right to Work Act, Act 252 of 1954, 5
provides in section 1:6
"It is hereby declared to be the public policy of Louisi-
ana that the right of a person or persons to work shall not
be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-mem-
bership in any labor union or labor organization." (Emphasis
added.)
Another statement of policy is found in the savings clause of the
act, section 10, 7 which reads:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to deny or abridge
the right of employees by and through a labor organization
or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer."
(Emphasis added.)
The term "bargain collectively" in section 10 indicates the per-
missible sphere of union activity under the act. The term is not
defined in the act, nor has any Louisiana court provided a defi-
nition. However, since it is used in the same context in the fed-
eral statutes,8 it can be argued that resort should be made to
previous judicial interpretations of "collective bargaining." In
NLRB v. J. I. Case Co., the United States Supreme Court stated:
"The very purpose of providing by statute for collective
agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements
of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bar-
gaining power and serve the welfare of the group. Its bene-
fits and advantages are open to every employee of the rep-
resentative unit whatever the type or terms of his pre-exist-
ing contract of employment."9
Under such an agreement individual representation and bargain-
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§95:78-84 (1950) ; N.D. REV. CODE § 34-0114 (Supp. 1949);
S.C. Acts 1954, No. 652, p. 1692; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2 as amended; TENN.
CODE § 11412.8 (1934) ; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 52 07a (Vernon 1925) ; Utah
Laws 1955, c. 54, p. 80; VA. CODE §§ 40:68-74.5 (1950).
5. LA. R.S. 23:881-888 (1950).
6. Id. 23:881.
7. Id. 23:887.
8. Section 7 of the LMRA provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing ... ." (Emphasis added.) 61 STAT.
140, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947). This language was unchanged from the earlier Na-
tional Labor Relations Acts.
9. 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944).
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ing are precluded. Insofar as representation and recognition are
concerned, the will of the majority of the employees in a unit is
controlling. Although this understanding of the nature of the
collective bargaining agreement precludes individual bargaining,
it should be noticed that it does not require an individual to be-
long to a labor organization. The individual is compelled only to
accept the will of the majority in having the union represent the
employees in that unit. An examination of section 1 of the
Louisiana act reveals that one of the purposes of that legislation
is to insure that employees will not be compelled to become mem-
bers of a labor organization. The language of section 1 of the
act does not restrict a union in its representation of all the em-
ployees, but only forbids union membership as a condition of em-
ployment. Therefore, when section 10) speaks of "bargaining col-
lectively," it must refer to the general understanding of that
term since the Case decision, that is, the recognized union repre-
sents all employees in the unit. Furthermore, section 10 appears
to be repetitious of the policy expressed in an earlier Louisiana
statute, the "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act." 10 This latter legis-
lation recognized that "it is necessary that the individual work-
man have full freedom of association, self-organization and
designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate
the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be
free from the interference, restraint of coercion of employers of
labor."'1 Also, the Louisiana Mediation and Arbitration Stat-
ute12 speaks of "collective bargaining between employers and the
representatives of their employees." 8 The language of these two
statutes appears to substantiate the view that section 10 of the
Right to Work Act preserves to labor organizations the funda-
mental feature of collective bargaining, that of representing all
the employees in a unit.
From this analysis of section 10, what the legislature in-
tended in section 1 can be easily ascertained. That section con-
cerns the question of "union security," that is, it amounts to a
prohibition against a denial of employment because of union
10. LA. R.S. 23:822-848 (1950). It should be noted that the provisions of
this act referring to the use of the injunction have been declared unconstitutional.
Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972, 74 So.2d 182 (1954), 15
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 476 (1955). However, the policy statements in the act
do not appear to have been affected by the decision.
11. LA. R.S. 23:822 (1950).
12. Id. 23:861-876.
13. Id. 23:861(2).
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membership or non-membership. Nowhere in this section or
those that follow (with the exception of section 10) does the act
refer to recognition. It should also be noted that section 214 pro-
hibits the acquisition of an "employment monopoly in any enter-
prise." Again, this is not a prohibition against collective bar-
gaining or the right to enter into a sole collective bargaining
agreement, but is a clear prohibition against labor union control
of employment by dictating who may work and who may not
work. From this analysis it is apparent that the legislature in-
tended to prevent agreements whereby membership in a union is
a condition of employment, and not to prohibit collective bar-
gaining as such. Section 14 (b) of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act seems to support this conclusion. That section author-
izes state prohibitions of union security agreements in interstate
commerce, but does not authorize a prohibition of collective bar-
gaining in this area of commerce.'
In the instant case the court relied exclusively upon section
I of the Right to Work Act, and decided that if plaintiff signed
an agreement recognizing the union as the sole collective bar-
gaining agent of all the employees, a non-union employee's rights
would be abridged. The term abridged, as used in section 1, was
construed to mean "diminished, reduced, curtailed, or short-
ened." The court further stated that "liberty of contract is the
non-union man's prerogative." If this decision may be used as
a guide to future interpretation of the act, it is clear that the
court will allow union organization, but such unions will be per-
mitted to represent only those employees that are union members.
It is doubtful whether the advocates of the controversial legisla-
tion contemplated that the act would have such a drastic effect
upon collective bargaining. 16 The court obviously confused
.14. Id. 23:882.
15. Section 14(b) authorizes state regulation of agreements which require
membership as a condition of employment. Section 4 of the Right to Work Act,
LA.R.S. 23:883(B) (1950), also regulates conduct which induces a violation of
the act. Therefore, in a situation involving interstate commerce, where the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 is applicable, it is questionable whether this
provision of the Louisiana act is valid, as it appears to be in conflict with the
federal act.
16. Borron, The Case for the Right to Work Act, 15 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW
66, 71 (1954), wherein the author remarks: "The act does not affect the right of
employees to join a union or retain their union membership . . . . [I]t expressly
provides to the contrary. The act does not interfere with the right of employees
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. Section 10
of the Act expressly guarantees this right."
Another writer, discussing the scope and effect of the act, commented: "The
act does not infringe upon the right of an employee to join a union, nor upon the
right of the union of his choice to bargain collectively for him and the other em-
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"union security" and "recognition." By denying defendant union
the privilege of peaceful picketing for the latter right, the court
did not follow the command of the legislature expressed in sec-
tion 10, that is, the right to bargain collectively shall not be
abridged. If the proposed contract submitted to plaintiff had
requested that membership in the defendant union be made a
condition of employment, it is obvious that under section 1 it
would have been unlawful for plaintiff to sign the contract. De-
fendant did not ask for such an agreement, but only to be recog-
nized as the bargaining agent of the employees. Furthermore,
the construction given section 1 by the court renders that section
irreconcilable with the prohibition in section 10 against abridge-
ment of the right to organize. By applying the court's defini-
tion of the term "abridged" to the situation of the union meat-
cutters in the instant decision, the inevitable conclusion is that
their rights, too, have been "diminished, reduced, curtailed, or
shortened." They were prohibited from doing what section 10
had reserved to them. Finally, the court's argument that the
non-union employee's rights under section 1 would have been
infringed had plaintiff signed the agreement seems hardly plaus-
ible as there were no non-union employees in plaintiff's employ
at the time the agreement was presented to plaintiff for his ac-
ceptance. Only after the strike by the two meatcutters was there
a non-union employee.
In his dissenting opinion Justice Hawthorne concluded that
"in effect, what the majority opinion holds in the instant case is
that collective bargaining through a representative chosen by the
majority of the employees, to represent all the employees, union
or non-union, is illegal and in violation of the Right to Work
law, and that peaceful picketing for recognition of such right
may be restrained or enjoined." The writer suggests that the
court erred in its construction of section 1 of the act by con-
fusing two fundamental terms in labor management relations,
that is, "union security" and "recognition."
Jerry G. Jones
ployees whom it represents. The public policy of Louisiana, elsewhere expressed in
its laws, favoring collective bargaining as a means of achieving stable labor rela-
tions, is not abridged. Labor agreements setting forth the wages, hours, vacations,
pensions and other conditions of employment, and providing procedures for the
settlement of disputes and grievances may still be entered into between employers
and unions." Kennan & Lang, The Louisiana Right to Work Law - Some Com-
ments as to its Scope and Effect, 2 LA. B.J. 3, 6 (1954) ; see Dodd, The Case
Against the So-Called Rights to Work Act, 15 LOUISIANA LAw REviEw 74 (1954).
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